Abstract
We analyze the cost allocation strategies associated with the problem of broadcasting information from some source to a number of communication network users. A multicast routing chooses a minimum cost tree network that spans the source and all the receivers. The cost of such a network is distributed among its receivers who may be individuals or organizations with possibly conflicting interests. Providing network developers, users and owners with practical computable 'fair' cost allocation solution procedures is of great importance for network management. Consequently this multidisciplinary problem was extensively studied by Operational Researchers, Economists. Mathematicians and Computer Scientists. The fairness of various proposed solutions was even argued in US courts. This presentation overviews some previously published, as well as some recent results, in the development of algorithmic mechanisms to efficiently compute 'attractive' cost allocation solutions for multicast networks. Specifically, we will analyze cooperative game theory based cost allocation models that avoid cross subsidies and/or are distance and population monotonic. We will also present some related open cost allocation problems and the potential contribution that such models might make to this problem in the future.