Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of board structure on non-US acquirer returns in 11,499 acquisition transactions from 60 countries during the period from 2001 to 2011.
Design/methodology/approach
In this paper the authors employ event study methodology and regression analyses including instrumental variables two-stage least squares regressions.
Findings
The authors find that board independence in non-US firms is associated with significantly higher acquirer returns, but this effect is only present in countries with lower levels of investor protection. The authors contribute to the literature by documenting that due to the substitution effect between internal and external governance, when external governance mechanisms are not adequately developed, better internal governance (as measured by higher degree of board independence) reduces agency problems and leads to better firm decisions and outcomes (as measured by the quality of corporate acquisitions).
Originality/value
The paper is the first to empirically examine the relation between board independence and acquirer returns in non-US firms. The findings have important implications for both company managers and national policy makers who are debating the costs and benefits associated with increasing the degree of board independence in publicly traded companies around the world.