Abstract
The years 2001-02 were marked with an outburst of huge corporate financial failures that eroded billions of dollars from the stockholders’ equity and shook the confidence of the investor community. One of the issues that rose to the surface was the payment of huge nonaudit service fees by publicly traded companies to their auditors. In response to the outcry against the alleged role of the auditors in the corporate scandals, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed a prohibition on the supply of certain nonaudit services by a CPA firm to its audit clients in order to reduce the suspected revenue-dependence of auditors on their audit clients. The study described in this paper examines the pattern of auditor compensation in the years 2001 and 2004 (i.e., pre- and post-SOX periods), for a sample of large public companies, to determine how the auditor compensation has changed during this three-year period and whether the new regulations have decreased such revenue-dependence of the auditor. The study also examines if each of the Big 4 CPA firms that dominate the audit market for large public companies have experienced a change in the pattern of their revenues drawn from different sources of auditor compensation. The results show that not only the composition of auditor compensation has changed after the passage of SOX but also the overall compensation paid by the sampled companies to their auditors has gone up noticeably in many cases, primarily due to a phenomenal rise in audit fees, which still may continue to threaten the auditor’s independence in the audit process. Further, during this three-year period, each of the Big 4 CPA firms has shifted its emphasis on the different sources of its revenues from these large public companies.