Abstract
Recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer. In this paper, we explore the role of vertical co-op advertising efficiency of transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer. We address the impact of brand name investments, local advertising, and sharing policy on co-op advertising programs in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain. Game theory concepts form the foundation for the analysis. We begin with the classical co-op advertising model where the manufacturer, as the leader, first specifies its strategy. The retailer, as the follower, then decides on its decision. We then relax the assumption of retailer's inability to influence the manufacturer's decisions and discuss full coordination between the manufacturer and the retailer on co-op advertising.